

**Nasser, Hani**

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**From:** FOSTER, Robert -KYIV -DR <Robert.FOSTER@c.international.gc.ca>  
**Sent:** June 9, 2022 11:01 AM  
**To:** Nasser, Hani  
**Subject:** FW: KYIV-1712: Ukraine's Deputy Minister of Defence provides assessment of the war

**Classification: SECRET // CANADIAN EYES ONLY**  
**Classification: SECRET // RÉSERVÉ AUX CANADIENS**

Hani,

Here is the report from 17 May.

R.M. Foster  
Colonel  
Canadian Defence Attaché- Ukraine

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**From:** Aliyeva, Zeynab -KYIV -GR  
**Sent:** May-18-22 3:11 PM  
**To:** \*ECU  
**Subject:** KYIV-1712: Ukraine's Deputy Minister of Defence provides assessment of the war

**Classification: SECRET // CANADIAN EYES ONLY**  
**Classification: SECRET // RÉSERVÉ AUX CANADIENS**

**\*\*Sent on behalf of KYIV/ [REDACTED] \*\***

**Summary:**

The main highlights of KYIV HOM's May 17 meeting with Deputy Minister of Defence Hanna Malyar were:

[REDACTED]

**Reftel:** KYIV-1708: Ukraine's Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration provides reality check on the war

**Report:** On May 17, KYIV HOM met with Hanna Malyar, one of six Deputy Ministers of Defence, for an update on the state of the Russo-Ukraine war. Other than Minister Oleksiy Reznikov, Malyar serves as the main MOD spokesperson, although her role goes well beyond just providing public briefings. Prior to assuming her current post in August 2021, Malyar, who holds a PhD in Law, taught courses in international humanitarian law (IHL) and on prosecuting war crimes, was a consultant to the Verkhovna Rada Committee on National Security, Defence and Intelligence.

[REDACTED]

**Page 2**

**is withheld pursuant to sections  
est retenue en vertu des articles**

**13(1)(a), 15(1)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

Drafted: KYIV-FPDS/  
Approved: KYIV HOM

BCC list: \*DMA <[D-DMA@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:D-DMA@c.international.gc.ca)>; \*IFM <[D-IFM@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:D-IFM@c.international.gc.ca)>; \*USS <[D-USS@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:D-USS@c.international.gc.ca)>; \*USS-DMA Advisors C5/Conseillers C5 <[D-USS-DMAAdvisorsC5ConseillersC5@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:D-USS-DMAAdvisorsC5ConseillersC5@c.international.gc.ca)>; \*EGM <[D-EGM@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:D-EGM@c.international.gc.ca)>; \*CFM <[D-CFM@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:D-CFM@c.international.gc.ca)>; \*JUS <[D-JUS@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:D-JUS@c.international.gc.ca)>; \*ECU <[D-ECU@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:D-ECU@c.international.gc.ca)>; \*EUD-ECD-HOM <[D-EUD-ECD-HOM@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:D-EUD-ECD-HOM@c.international.gc.ca)>; \*EUD-ECD-FPDS-HEADS <[D-EUD-ECD-FPDS-HEADS@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:D-EUD-ECD-FPDS-HEADS@c.international.gc.ca)>; \*EUD-ECD-FPDS/SPED-PM/GP <[D-EUD-ECD-FPDS\\_SPED-PM\\_GP@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:D-EUD-ECD-FPDS_SPED-PM_GP@c.international.gc.ca)>; \*IGR-Russia/Ukraine <[D-IGR-Russia/Ukraine@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:D-IGR-Russia/Ukraine@c.international.gc.ca)>; \*IGD <[D-IGD@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:D-IGD@c.international.gc.ca)>; Turner, Andrew -ECE <[Andrew.Turner@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:Andrew.Turner@c.international.gc.ca)>; Stewart, Allison -ECE <[Allison.Stewart@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:Allison.Stewart@c.international.gc.ca)>; Wojnarowicz, Krystyna -ECE <[Krystyna.Wojnarowicz@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:Krystyna.Wojnarowicz@c.international.gc.ca)>; Kinnear, Jocelyn -VOSCE -HOM/CDM <[Jocelyn.Kinnear@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:Jocelyn.Kinnear@c.international.gc.ca)>; Steenweg, Rick -VOSCE -GR <[Rick.Steenweg@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:Rick.Steenweg@c.international.gc.ca)>; LeClaire, Alison -MOSCO -HOM/CDM <[Alison.LeClaire@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:Alison.LeClaire@c.international.gc.ca)>; Simoneau, Sarah -BREU -GR <[Sarah.Simoneau@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:Sarah.Simoneau@c.international.gc.ca)>; Poulin, Olivier -BNATO -GR <[Olivier.Poulin@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:Olivier.Poulin@c.international.gc.ca)>; Vidal, Maeva -BNATO -GR <[Maeva.Vidal@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:Maeva.Vidal@c.international.gc.ca)>; Ionescu, Vlad -KYIV -DA <[Vlad.Ionescu@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:Vlad.Ionescu@c.international.gc.ca)>; \*KYIV <[D-KYIV@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:D-KYIV@c.international.gc.ca)>; Hughes, Steven -INA <[Steven.Hughes@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:Steven.Hughes@c.international.gc.ca)>; Yendall, Jonathan -INA <[Jonathan.Yendall@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:Jonathan.Yendall@c.international.gc.ca)>; Lorenzoni, Cristian -INA <[Cristian.Lorenzoni@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:Cristian.Lorenzoni@c.international.gc.ca)>; Tereszowski, Adam -INA <[Adam.Tereszowski@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:Adam.Tereszowski@c.international.gc.ca)>; Marin-Aponte, Alfonso -INT <[Alfonso.Marin-Aponte@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:Alfonso.Marin-Aponte@c.international.gc.ca)>; Hurst, Andrew -MEF <[Andrew.Hurst@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:Andrew.Hurst@c.international.gc.ca)>; Richardson, Joanna -MEF <[Joanna.Richardson@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:Joanna.Richardson@c.international.gc.ca)>; Kennedy, Karen -BREU -TD <[Karen.Kennedy@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:Karen.Kennedy@c.international.gc.ca)>; Saunders, Allison -BREU -TD <[Allison.Saunders@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:Allison.Saunders@c.international.gc.ca)>; Senay, Claudie -IFM <[Claudie.Senay@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:Claudie.Senay@c.international.gc.ca)>; Dean, Geoffrey -IRZ <[Geoffrey.Dean@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:Geoffrey.Dean@c.international.gc.ca)>; Parsons, James -IRG <[James.Parsons@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:James.Parsons@c.international.gc.ca)>; Fraser, Sean -IRZ <[Sean.Fraser@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:Sean.Fraser@c.international.gc.ca)>; Lehmeier, Carrie -IRG <[Carrie.Lehmeier@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:Carrie.Lehmeier@c.international.gc.ca)>; Kondracki, Nina -IRG <[Nina.Kondracki@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:Nina.Kondracki@c.international.gc.ca)>; Castillo, Juan Camilo -IRZ <[JuanCamilo.Castillo@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:JuanCamilo.Castillo@c.international.gc.ca)>; Cantin, Marie-Danielle -HFXO <[Marie-Danielle.Cantin@c.international.gc.ca](mailto:Marie-Danielle.Cantin@c.international.gc.ca)>; Kaduck, Michael <[Michael.Kaduck@c.pco-bcp.gc.ca](mailto:Michael.Kaduck@c.pco-bcp.gc.ca)>; Mastelica, Kristina <[Kristina.Mastelica@c.pco-bcp.gc.ca](mailto:Kristina.Mastelica@c.pco-bcp.gc.ca)>; @Polhq.cmil.ca; vincent.lussier@c.pco-bcp.gc.ca; devin.conley@c.pco-bcp.gc.ca; Miville-Deschenes, Frederic -INA Frederic.Miville-Deschenes@c.international.gc.ca

### **Zeynab Aliyeva | Зейнаб Алієва**

First Secretary (Political) | Première Secrétaire (Politique) | Перший секретар (політичний відділ)

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Embassy of Canada | Ambassade du Canada | Посольство Канади

## Cyr Maj SA@ADM(PA) DGPA@Ottawa-Hull

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**From:** Perreault BGen R@ADM(PA) DGPA@Ottawa-Hull  
**Sent:** April 12, 2022 4:30 PM  
**To:** Salloum Col AE@ADM(PA) DPAPO@Ottawa-Hull  
**Subject:** FW: RE: RFI — Fwd: For Info - Op UNIFIER - Far-Right Element Training -  
**Attachments:** Fwd: Azov Lines

Andre,  
Looks like the line we shared on Azov Bn w MNDO Comms went from their office to Ops to be approved/validated. They're from existing content, ain't it?

Worth a convo w

Rick

BGen/Bgén Richard Perreault  
(He/il)

Director General Public Affairs and Strategic Planning, ADM(PA)  
Canadian Armed Forces  
[Richard.Perreault@forces.gc.ca](mailto:Richard.Perreault@forces.gc.ca) / Tel: 613-904-3247 / Mobile: 613-882-8122

Directeur général de la planification stratégique et des affaires publiques, SMA(AP)  
Forces armées canadiennes  
[Richard.Perreault@forces.gc.ca](mailto:Richard.Perreault@forces.gc.ca) / Tél : 613-904-3247 / mobile: 613-882-8122

**From:** Laforest BGen E@SJS DGO@Ottawa-Hull  
**Sent:** April 12, 2022 4:22 PM  
**To:** Perreault BGen R@ADM(PA) DGPA@Ottawa-Hull <[RICHARD.PERREAULT@forces.gc.ca](mailto:RICHARD.PERREAULT@forces.gc.ca)>  
**Subject:** FW: RE: RFI — Fwd: For Info - Op UNIFIER - Far-Right Element Training -

Salut Richard,

Voit plus bas stp - MNDO vient au SJS pour confirmer les lignes qu'ADM PA a approuvées en réponse à la question sur le Far-Right Element Training.

À moins que je ne me trompe, ces réponses pré-approuvées passent déjà à travers un processus d'approbation. Peux-tu entrer en contact avec MNDO et expliquer le processus (car je ne crois pas le SJS devrait « vérifier après les faits »).

Merci!

BGen Éric Laforest  
DGO, SJS  
DND/MND  
Tel: (Pearkes) 613.996.8364 (Cell/mob) 343.549.5779  
JSIS: 5615040

**From:** Thompson Maj J@SJS@Ottawa-Hull  
**Sent:** April 12, 2022 4:11 PM  
**To:** Dove Col RD@SJS DCO@Ottawa-Hull <[Robbin.Dove@forces.gc.ca](mailto:Robbin.Dove@forces.gc.ca)>; Reekie LCol MJ@SJS DCO@Ottawa-Hull

<MICHAEL.REEKIE@forces.gc.ca>; Holder Maj KM@ADM(PA) DPAP0@Ottawa-Hull <KARINA.HOLDER@forces.gc.ca>  
**Cc:** Laforest BGen E@SJS DGO@Ottawa-Hull <ERIC.LAFOREST@forces.gc.ca>; Campos Capt D@SJS DGO@Ottawa-Hull  
 <Danielle.Campos@forces.gc.ca>  
**Subject:** FW: RE: RFI — Fwd: For Info - Op UNIFIER - Far-Right Element Training -

Sir:

MNDO RFI below.

Respectfully,

Major Jay Thompson

Executive Assistant to the Director of Staff, Strategic Joint Staff  
 Canadian Armed Forces  
 Tel: (Pearkes) 613-992-1551 / Cell: 613-293-1361

Chef de cabinet du directeur de l'état-major, État-major interarmées stratégique  
 Forces armées canadiennes  
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DWAN: [jason.thompson3@forces.gc.ca](mailto:jason.thompson3@forces.gc.ca)  
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 CRZ : [thompson.j@crz.cmil.ca](mailto:thompson.j@crz.cmil.ca)

**From:** Rivera LCdr ADM@MND@Ottawa-Hull  
**Sent:** April 12, 2022 4:07 PM  
**To:** Thompson Maj J@SJS@Ottawa-Hull <Jason.Thompson3@forces.gc.ca>  
**Cc:** ++MA-AM@MND@Ottawa-Hull <MA.AM@forces.gc.ca>; Williams K@ADM(PA) DGPA@Ottawa-Hull  
 <KATIE.WILLIAMS@forces.gc.ca>; Zigoumis C@ADM(PA)@Ottawa-Hull <CONSTANTINE.ZIGOUMIS@forces.gc.ca>;  
 +MNDO Travel - Voyage BMDN@MND@Ottawa-Hull <MNDOTravel-VoyageBMDN@forces.gc.ca>  
**Subject:** RE: RFI — Fwd: For Info - Op UNIFIER - Far-Right Element Training -

Jason,

As discussed, we have received a RFI from MNDO Comms requesting this be sourced via CAF Ops to provide a response and confirmation of the following interview and approved media response lines that were used in the interview at reference:

**PART 1 – As a result of the RDI/Radio Canada coverage (at link), the following Q & As were generated:**

Reference RDI — <https://ici.radio-canada.ca/nouvelle/1873461/canada-regiment-ukrainien-lie-extreme-droite-azov>

Reporter has seen the Radio-Canada coverage and is asking about the photo in the article taken by Avr Melissa Gloude. While he already has previous response specific to the Azov Battalion, he is asking about far-right elements, beyond the Azov Battalion. His question

*1) Query: “How can the CAF/CJOC deny training far right elements of Ukraine’s military when the CAF photo shows a Ukrainian soldier wearing the crest of the Ukraine Waffen SS unit, Galicia? (The 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS (1st Galician). Is the claim by CJOC an attempt to conduct information operations against the Canadian news media?”*

The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) are strongly opposed to the glorification of Nazism and all forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, intolerance and extremism.

All members deploying on Operation UNIFIER are briefed to help them recognize patches and insignia associated with right-wing extremism. If Canadian soldiers suspect that their Ukrainian counterparts or trainees hold racist views or belong to right-wing extremist elements, they are removed immediately. There is no burden of proof on the CAF to demonstrate this beyond a reasonable doubt. The CAF takes every reasonable measure to ensure no training is provided to members of extremist elements. This is not unique to Ukraine, this is how the CAF handles all capacity building programs with other countries. Ultimately, Ukraine is a sovereign country and thus is responsible for recruiting and vetting its own security forces.

The CAF is committed to promoting tolerance and respect for human rights, and aim to model those values to our training partners. Our close bilateral relationship with Ukraine includes ongoing dialogue on the development of a diverse and inclusive Ukraine. We continue to be vehemently opposed to any and all racist, discriminatory and hateful views and the groups that promote them.

**2) On the review of extremism / training of suspected white supremacists**

The examination into the incidents brought forward in the George Washington University report is nearing completion, but has not yet been finalized.

Once complete, the findings will be briefed to senior Defence leadership and key stakeholders first before being made public, subject to operational security restrictions.

**3) Did Canadian military instructors directly train Azov fighters in Zolochiv?**

No. The CAF has never provided any training to members of the Azov Battalion. Operation UNIFIER members have always been directed to not train and to not have contact with Azov members.

**4) Does the Canadian military verify the allegiance of the military they train in Zolochiv?**

No. Ukraine is a sovereign country and vetting trainees is a host nation responsibility.

The CAF does not have the authority or mandate to investigate soldiers from other nations. However, Operation UNIFIER has always had the obligation and the right to ask the command staff of Ukrainian training facilities or military academies to remove from the courses delivered or mentored by CAF members any Ukrainian soldier they suspect to be not “suitable” from a Canadian values or international law (in particular the Law of Armed Conflict) perspective.

In essence, Operation UNIFIER retains the right to refuse training on these grounds.

**\*\*Note\*\*:** Response to the queries above were provided by Mr Andrew McKelvey, Senior Communications Advisor, Media Relations Office, Department of National Defence | Government of Canada  
[andrew.mckelvey@forces.gc.ca](mailto:andrew.mckelvey@forces.gc.ca) 613-552-8420

**PART 2 – ADP(PA) attempted to address MNDO Comms , however, a request was received for specific confirmation and validation through Ops**

MNDO requests Ops to affirm the accuracy of statements from approved ADM(PA) MRLs (see attached Azov MRL lines) namely:

- 1) What steps have been taken to ensure that training to help recognize patches and insignia associated with right-wing extremism in Ukraine was provided?
- 2) From the statement “All members deploying on Operation UNIFIER are briefed to help them recognize patches and insignia associated with right-wing extremism.” Were they briefed on the patch / insignia in the aforementioned photographs in the article (at link)?
- 3) If not Azov or its affiliates, what extremist element (or national element) is the reporter referring to with the patches / insignias that are pictured in the photograph?

Thank you for any assistance you can coord with CJOC to respond to this RFI.

Sincerely,

*LCdr Audrey D.M. Rivera*  
*(she/her, elle)*

Military Assistant to the Minister of National of National Defence  
Office of the Minister of National Defence  
Department of National Defence / Gouvernement du Canada  
[Audrey.Rivera@forces.gc.ca](mailto:Audrey.Rivera@forces.gc.ca) / Telephone: 613-995-6855 / RCCC: 995-6855 / Cell: 343-551-1284

Adjointe militaire auprès du Ministre de la Défense nationale  
Cabinet du Ministre de la Défense nationale  
Ministère de la Défense nationale / Gouvernement du Canada  
[Audrey.Rivera@forces.gc.ca](mailto:Audrey.Rivera@forces.gc.ca) / Téléphone: 613-995-6855 / RCCC: 995-6855 / Cell: 343-551-1284

## Cyr Maj SA@ADM(PA) DGPA@Ottawa-Hull

---

**From:** Salloum Col AE@ADM(PA) DPAP0@Ottawa-Hull  
**Sent:** April 11, 2022 7:54 AM  
**To:** Williams K@ADM(PA) DGPA@Ottawa-Hull  
**Subject:** Fwd: Azov Lines

Col A.E. Salloum, APR  
DPAP0 / PA Branch Advisor ADM(PA)  
Canadian Armed Forces  
613 325 7620 (Cell)

Begin forwarded message:

**From:** "Hennessy LCol AD@ADM(PA) DPAP0@Ottawa-Hull" <ANDREW.HENNESSY@forces.gc.ca>  
**Date:** April 11, 2022 at 7:49:41 AM EDT  
**To:** "+ADM(PA) Min Liaison - Liaison Min SMA(AP)@ADM(PA) DPAPI@Ottawa-Hull"  
<DPA.MinLiaison@forces.gc.ca>  
**Cc:** "+ADM(PA) SJSCLPA - SMA(AP)EMISLCAP@ADM(PA)@Ottawa-Hull" <ADMPA\_SJSCLPA-  
SMAAP\_EMISLCAP@forces.gc.ca>, "Salloum Col AE@ADM(PA) DPAP0@Ottawa-Hull"  
<ANDRE.SALLOUM@forces.gc.ca>  
**Subject:** FW: Azov Lines

Morning team,

Lines below. I will be on the 0930.

V/r,  
Andrew

Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew Hennessy

Head – Public Affairs Operations  
Assistant Deputy Minister (Public Affairs) / Strategic Joint Staff  
Canadian Armed Forces  
[andrew.hennessy@forces.gc.ca](mailto:andrew.hennessy@forces.gc.ca) / Office: 613 901 3758 / Cell: 343-553-5976

Chef – Affaires publiques Opérations  
Sous-ministre adjoint (Affaires publiques) / État-major interarmées stratégique  
Forces armées canadiennes  
[andrew.hennessy@forces.gc.ca](mailto:andrew.hennessy@forces.gc.ca) / Bureau: 613 901 3758 / Cellulaire: 343-553-5976

**From:** Lebouthillier D@ADM(PA) DRMCC@Ottawa-Hull  
**Sent:** April 11, 2022 7:48 AM



**To:** Hennessy LCol AD@ADM(PA) DPAPO@Ottawa-Hull <ANDREW.HENNESSY@forces.gc.ca>  
**Subject:** Fwd: Azov Lines

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

**From:** "Lebouthillier D@ADM(PA) DRMCC@Ottawa-Hull"  
<[DANIEL.LEBOUTHILLIER@forces.gc.ca](mailto:DANIEL.LEBOUTHILLIER@forces.gc.ca)>  
**Date:** April 11, 2022 at 7:10:00 AM EDT  
**To:** @MND@Ottawa-Hull" <[@forces.gc.ca](mailto:@forces.gc.ca)>  
**Subject:** Azov Lines

### **On training of the Azov Battalion**

As we have previously stated, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces are strongly opposed to the glorification of Nazism and all forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, intolerance and extremism.

In all of our international relationships, we seek to promote tolerance, inclusiveness and respect for human rights, diversity and the rule of law.

Our close bilateral relationship with Ukraine has always included dialogue on the development of a diverse and inclusive Ukraine and we have condemned xenophobic far-right attacks on Roma people.

What is clear is that our official position remains that we do not support the Azov Battalion or affiliated entities.

We continue to vehemently oppose any and all racist, discriminatory and hateful views and the groups that promote them.

### **On the review of extremism / training of suspected white supremacists**

The examination into the incidents brought forward in the George Washington University report is nearing completion, but has not yet been finalized.

Once complete, the findings will be briefed to senior Defence leadership and key stakeholders first before being made public, subject to operational security restrictions.

The Canadian Armed Forces are committed to promoting tolerance and respect for human rights, and aim to model those values to our training partners. We are committed to ensuring that we have the proper safeguards in place to ensure that those who hold contrary beliefs do not benefit from our training.

### **Qs and As:**

#### **Did Canadian military instructors directly train Azov fighters in Zolochiv?**

No. The CAF has never provided any training to members of the Azov Battalion. Operation UNIFIER members have always been directed to not train and to not have contact with Azov members.

#### **Does the Canadian military verify the allegiance of the military they train in Zolochiv?**

No. Ukraine is a sovereign country and vetting trainees is a host nation responsibility.

The CAF does not have the authority or mandate to investigate soldiers from other nations. However, Operation UNIFIER has always had the obligation and the right to ask the command staff of Ukrainian training facilities or military academies to remove from the courses delivered or mentored by CAF members any Ukrainian soldier they suspect to be not "suitable" from a Canadian values or international law (in particular the Law of Armed Conflict) perspective.

In essence, Operation UNIFIER retains the right to refuse training on these grounds.

**Could it be that the Azov Battalion have access to the training designed as part of Operation UNIFIER without CAF being aware of it?**

A18: Once courseware or training curricula have been developed by Ukrainian training centers with expertise support from Operation UNIFIER, it is their responsibility to deliver courses or training to the training audiences they select.

Operation UNIFIER members do not have any oversight on who is selected to attend the courses or the training sessions. However, as mentioned above, the CAF has always had the obligation and right to ask the Ukrainian command staff to remove from the courses they deliver or mentor any Ukrainian member they suspect to be not "suitable" from a Canadian values or from the perspective of international law.

**You say. "Canada has never funded a training center or training program for Ukrainian Security Forces (SFU) organizations, including the National Guard of Ukraine (NGU) training center in Zolochiv." But did CAF participate in the training of the National Guard of Ukraine in Zolochiv?**

Since the beginning of Operation UNIFIER in September 2015, Canada has contributed to training and courseware development in many military academies and training centers throughout Ukraine, but Canada never financed any training centre or programme for the Ukrainians.

The Operation UNIFIER budget is strictly dedicated to the operations and real life support of the CAF members deployed to Ukraine. Ukraine funds the building, development, and operations - to include courseware development and programme delivery - of their training facilities or military academies, as well as the wages of the Ukrainian personnel who staff these entities.

Under Operation UNIFIER, CAF members did contribute to the training of the National Guard of Ukraine in Zolochiv, through courseware development and trainers mentorship activities. This support never included any training centre or programme funding by Canada.

**From what is observed on the Ukrainian media, we understand that CAF had a permanent presence in Zolochiv through Operation UNIFIER from the end of 2019 to 2021. Is it possible to confirm or provide the dates of the Canadian presence in Zolochiv?**

Operation UNIFIER worked with the training centre in Zolochiv from February 20, 2019, to February 13, 2022.

**Daniel Le Bouthillier**  
**Head, Media Relations / Chef, Relations avec les médias**  
ADM (Public Affairs) / SMA (Affaires publiques)  
National Defence / Défense nationale  
Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada  
613-901-3681

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Suivez-nous sur Twitter [@ForcesCanada](https://twitter.com/ForcesCanada)

**Cyr Maj SA@ADM(PA) DGPA@Ottawa-Hull**

---

**From:** Ritchie BGen RT@VCDS@Ottawa-Hull  
**Sent:** September 24, 2022 12:54 PM  
**To:** Perreault BGen R@ADM(PA) DGPA@Ottawa-Hull  
**Subject:** RE: MRLs  
**Attachments:** SJS MRLs Ukraine-REASSURANCE-UNIFIER-PROJECTION Evergreens 6 Sept.docx

Rick:

Gold standard.

Mindful that we have an established trust relationship with CDAI and in particular, any concern if I provide the attached MRLs to him with the proviso that they are not published in the public media space?

Bob

BGen | Bgén Bob Ritchie

Chief of Staff to the VCDS  
 Canadian Armed Forces  
[robert.ritchie@forces.gc.ca](mailto:robert.ritchie@forces.gc.ca) / Tel: 613-901-6687 / Cell: 343-575-3207

Chef d'état-major du VCEMD  
 Forces armées canadiennes  
[robert.ritchie@forces.gc.ca](mailto:robert.ritchie@forces.gc.ca) / Tél: 613-901-6687 / Cell: 343-575-3207

**From:** Perreault BGen R@ADM(PA) DGPA@Ottawa-Hull  
**Sent:** September 24, 2022 12:40 PM  
**To:** Ritchie BGen RT@VCDS@Ottawa-Hull <ROBERT.RITCHIE@forces.gc.ca>  
**Cc:** Smith MGen GR@ADM(Pol) DGIS POL@Ottawa-Hull <Gregory.Smith@forces.gc.ca>  
**Subject:** RE: MRLs

Bob,  
 In addition to website I sent earlier, pls see attached MRLs which could be useful for

Furthermore, for SA, CBC published a story about donations earlier today and refers to MND's comments as well as content of an OPQ about possible surplus CAF equipment:

Bob Rae says Ukraine should get all the weapons Canada can find | CBC News:

"(...)On Thursday, Defence Minister Anita Anand pointed out that Canada is in the process of shipping 39 armoured troop carriers to Ukraine — part of an earlier commitment — and said she is in a constant dialogue with her Ukrainian counterpart.

"We'll be continuing the discussions next week," she said. "It would be imprudent for me to provide more information prior to finalizing the situation."

Apart from the brand-new light armoured vehicles and upgraded troop carriers Ukraine has asked for, the Canadian army also has a whole stock of used vehicles, including hundreds of Coyotes, Bisons and tracked armoured vehicles (known as T-LAVs).

Most of them, if not all, are the process of being decommissioned or scrapped. Many of them saw combat in Afghanistan.

Documents recently tabled in Parliament show the military conducted an inventory of those vehicles recently to determine what might be donated to Ukraine.

Out of a stock 149 Coyotes, which are used for reconnaissance, the army found 62 "which are deemed to be in repairable condition, but would require significant repairs and parts which would take over 220 days to procure."

Spare parts are a big issue, defence experts have said, because Canada and its allies don't want to give Ukraine broken or unserviceable equipment.

The answer to a written question posed in the House of Commons, tabled this week, said that no other fleet of armoured vehicles (Bisons, TLAVs, or M-113s) could be considered surplus by the Canadian Armed Forces.

"These vehicles are required to support Canadian Armed Forces operational capabilities, including for spare parts and logistics management," the written response says."

Hopefully this answers the mail on this.

Finally, I would recommend that should need similar language for engagements, our Outreach team would be happy to help. If he did and got very little support, I would be keen to hear about it and loop in their DG.

Bonne journée!  
Rick

BGen/Bgén Richard Perreault  
(He/il)

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**From:** Ritchie BGen RT@VCDS@Ottawa-Hull  
**Sent:** Saturday, September 24, 2022 09:41  
**To:** Perreault BGen R@ADM(PA) DGPA@Ottawa-Hull <[RICHARD.PERREULT@forces.gc.ca](mailto:RICHARD.PERREULT@forces.gc.ca)>  
**Cc:** Smith MGen GR@ADM(Pol) DGIS POL@Ottawa-Hull <[Gregory.Smith@forces.gc.ca](mailto:Gregory.Smith@forces.gc.ca)>  
**Subject:** MRLs

Rick:

Very helpful. I'll pass these along to at CDAI.

Thank you.

Bob

BGen | Bgén Bob Ritchie

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Canadian Armed Forces  
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**From:** Perreault BGen R@ADM(PA) DGPA@Ottawa-Hull  
**Sent:** September 24, 2022 9:38 AM  
**To:** Ritchie BGen RT@VCDS@Ottawa-Hull <[ROBERT.RITCHIE@forces.gc.ca](mailto:ROBERT.RITCHIE@forces.gc.ca)>  
**Subject:** MRLs

Good morning Bob,  
Ref CDAI interview, I have tasked my team to return with most up to date products.

In meantime, could do here: [Canadian military support to Ukraine - Canada.ca](https://www.canada.ca/en/department-of-national-defence/news/2022/09/canadian-military-support-to-ukraine.html) for the latest public comms on mil aid to UKR.

Op UNIFIER's page at [Operation UNIFIER - Canada.ca](https://www.canada.ca/en/department-of-national-defence/news/2022/09/operation-unifier.html) for more details about the op (maintained by CJOC).

Cheers,  
Rick

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## **MEDIA LINES / LIGNES DE PRESSE**

**ISSUE / ENJEU:** Canadian Armed Forces posture on Ukraine, during the Russian invasion.

**Media Query / Demande:** In anticipation of media queries.

**Reporter / Journaliste:** N/A

**Date:** Sept 6, 2022

**Deadline / Échéance:** N/A

## **OVERVIEW / APERÇU**

On February 24, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a “special military operation” and Russian troops launched their anticipated invasion of Ukraine.

Canada has demonstrated support for Ukraine diplomatically by joining other nations in calling for a peaceful solution, announcing economic sanctions against Russia, and remaining steadfast in denouncing the aggressive actions being taken by Russia toward Ukraine.

Material support for Ukraine has been made through loans to offset current and anticipated economic damages, the donation of military equipment, and the extension of Operations UNIFIER and REASSURANCE.

**Approach / Approche:** The Public Affairs approach will be active; however, aligned with Government of Canada communications objectives, along with NATO, Allies and partners.

## **KEY MESSAGES / MESSAGES CLÉS**

- Since February 2022, Canada has committed or delivered \$626 million in military assistance to Ukraine, including M777 howitzer artillery guns with replacement barrels and compatible ammunition, as well as specialized drone cameras and Armoured Combat Support Vehicles, and associated training.
- Since 2015, Canada has been with Ukraine and all of those under threat from Russia's actions. We have watched Ukrainian military become a more disciplined, more agile, and more effective fighting force. As soon as conditions allow, we will continue to provide training and capacity building to the Ukrainian military under Operation UNIFIER. We have also been providing support from a cyber-perspective and we will continue to do so.
- To complement the CAF troops already deployed in support of NATO in Eastern and Central Europe under Operation REASSURANCE, the CAF is strengthening NATO's deterrence and defence efforts by increasing available land, maritime, and air capabilities in Europe.

## **Operation UNIFIER**

- Operation UNIFIER, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) military training and capacity building mission in Ukraine, was launched in 2015 at the request of the Ukrainian government, and early this year, was expanded and extended until March 2025.
- Since the start of Op UNIFIER in September of 2015, the CAF has trained over 33,000 Ukrainian military and security personnel in battlefield tactics and advanced military skills. As the mission progressed, much of the direct training undertaken by CAF members transitioned to members of the Security Forces of Ukraine, with Canadians acting as advisors and mentors as well as assisting in the development of courses.
- Aspects of the mission were temporarily paused following the February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, with a commitment to resume training when and where conditions permitted.
- On Aug 4, 2022, the Minister of National Defence announced the deployment of CAF personnel to a British-led training initiative in the United Kingdom as part of Operation UNIFIER, to train new recruits for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The CAF will deploy up to 225 personnel, the majority of whom will work as trainers, supported by a command and control element, for an initial deployment of approximately four months.
- On August 25, the deployed CAF members began their first training serial of Ukrainian recruits in the United Kingdom as Operation UNIFIER resumes.

## **Operation REASSURANCE**

- Following the Russian invasion of Crimea, NATO Allies agreed at the 2016 Summit in Warsaw to establish an enhanced forward presence (eFP) in the eastern part of the Alliance, in order to strengthen deterrence measures. These battle groups formed part of the biggest reinforcement of NATO's collective defence in a generation.
- NATO has already increased its presence in the eastern part of the Alliance, and the readiness of the NATO Response Force. Additionally, in March 2022, NATO announced that four additional multinational battle groups will be established in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia and is also considering how to further strengthen deterrence and defence presence in central and south-eastern Europe.
- Operation REASSURANCE refers to the military activities undertaken by the CAF since 2014 to support NATO's assurance presence, posture, deterrence and defence measures in Eastern and Central Europe.
- Operation REASSURANCE enhances Canada's operational readiness and interoperability with our NATO allies and security partners while also strengthening NATO's collective capability to respond in a timely and effective manner to a variety of operational contingencies in Central and Eastern Europe.



- On March 8, 2022, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced that Canada will renew its multi-year commitment to Operation REASSURANCE, the CAF support to NATO's assurance and deterrence measures in Central and Eastern Europe. This announcement is a year ahead of schedule and responds to the changing security situation in Eastern Europe.

### **Information Environment – Cyber**

- National Defence recognizes that responding to cyber threats and operating in cyberspace is essential to defending Canada and Canadian interests. We collaborate with partners across the federal government, industry, and our allies, in accordance with Canadian and international laws, to uphold and defend these interests.
- Canada positions our military to anticipate emerging threats and challenges to Canada and Canadian interests, to adapt to changing circumstances by investing in capabilities based on foreseen threats, to challenges and opportunities, and to act effectively and decisively in cooperation with our allies and partners.
- Canada is committed to working closely with Ukraine to enhance resilience and cyber security in the face of evolving cyber risks and threats.
- Canada has established relationships with several Ukrainian cyber entities and has provided training in the areas of cyber defence operations and cyber event management processes. Canada continues to engage with Ukraine to support their cyber security activities.

### ***Extremism***

- The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces are strongly opposed to the glorification of Nazism and all forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, intolerance and extremism. In all of our international relationships, we seek to promote tolerance, inclusiveness and respect for human rights, diversity and the rule of law.
- Our close bilateral relationship with Ukraine includes ongoing dialogue on the development of a diverse and inclusive Ukraine and we have condemned xenophobic far-right attacks on Roma people. What is clear is that our official position remains that we have not - nor will we - be providing support to Azov and affiliated entities. We continue to vehemently oppose any and all racist, discriminatory and hateful views and the groups that promote them.

### **Questions and Answers**

#### **Q1: What kind of military aid has Canada provided to Ukraine?**

A1: In the face of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Canada continues to work closely with our Allies and partners to help Ukraine defend its sovereignty and security.

As of February 2022, Canada has committed or delivered \$626 million in military aid. This amount includes the complete allocation of \$500 million in military support for Ukraine announced in Budget 2022.

Ukrainian officials have asked that Allies and partners refrain from publicizing details about their military donations to Ukraine. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has also provided similar guidance.

Sharing this information puts Ukraine's defensive efforts at risk, along with the operational and physical security of both the aid and the people—military and civilian—on the ground.

Canada agrees with these assessments and going forward, will not publicly share new details about the specific delivery timelines, locations, or procedures.

Details of previous announcements:

- On June 30, 2022, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced Canada will donate six additional L3 Wescam drone cameras and is in the process of finalizing negotiations to provide up to 39 armoured combat support vehicles, including elements for repairs and servicing. This completed Budget 2022's allocation of \$500 million in military support for Ukraine.
- On June 15, 2022, the Government of Canada announced that Canada will provide to Ukraine 10 replacement barrels to enable the sustainment of M777 howitzer artillery guns. This military aid is valued at approximately \$9 million, and it complements Canada's previous donation of M777 howitzers, over 20,000 rounds of compatible artillery ammunition, and the Canadian Armed Forces' training of Ukrainian Forces in the use of this equipment.
- On May 24, 2022, the Government of Canada announced that Canada has purchased over 20,000 rounds of 155 mm artillery, which is NATO's standard artillery calibre. This package will also include fuses and charge bags at a cost of \$98 million. These rounds are compatible with artillery guns provided by Canada and our Allies.
- On May 8, 2022, the Government of Canada announced \$50 million in military assistance, including:
  - drone cameras, including in-service support and repair.
  - \$15 million for high-resolution satellite imagery.
  - Up to \$1 million in small arms and related ammunition.
  - additional ammunition for M777 Howitzers.
- On April 22, 2022, the Government of Canada announced that Canada has now delivered a number of M777 howitzers and associated ammunition to the Security Forces of Ukraine, in conjunction with our American allies.
  - Canada has provided Ukraine with a significant number of additional Carl Gustaf anti-armour ammunition.

- Finally, Canada has finalized contracts for a number of commercial pattern armoured vehicles, which will be sent to Ukraine as soon as possible, and a service contract for the maintenance and repair of specialized drone cameras that Canada has already supplied to Ukraine.
- While this equipment comes from the inventory of the Canadian Armed Forces, the capability will be replenished.
- On March 9, 2022, the Government of Canada announced the contribution of \$50 million in military aid, including specialized military equipment.
- On March 3, 2022, the Government of Canada announced the donation of up to 4500 M72 rocket launchers and up to 7500 hand grenades, and contributions towards the purchase of commercial satellite high resolution and modern imagery that will be provided to Ukraine.
- On March 1, 2022, the Government of Canada announced the donation of 390,000 Individual Meal Packs, and approximately 1600 fragmentation vests.
- On February 28, 2022, the Government of Canada announced the donation from existing Canadian Armed Forces stocks of at least 100 anti-armour weapons systems - Carl Gustav M2 recoilless rifles, as well related accessories and scopes, 2000 rounds of 84 mm ammunition.
- On February 27, 2022, the Government of Canada announced \$25 million in defensive military aid, which could include: night vision gear, helmets, and body armour.
- As well, on February 27, 2022 the Government of Canada announced the deployment of two C-130J tactical airlift aircraft, along with an air detachment of 40-50 CAF personnel, to contribute to allied and partner efforts in Europe. Since then, Canada has transported over 3 million pounds of military donations on behalf of our Allies and partners in Europe.
- On February 14, 2022, the Government of Canada announced the donation of defensive military equipment to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This equipment includes machine guns, pistols, carbines, 1.5 million rounds of ammunition, sniper rifles, and various related equipment.
- On February 4, 2022, the Government of Canada announced the donation of personal protective and load carriage equipment, as well as surveillance and detection equipment.

**Q2: What is the 84mm Carl Gustaf (Carl G) 84mm anti-armour system?**

A2: The 84mm Carl Gustaf (Carl G) 84mm anti-armour system employed by the Canadian Army uses rocket-assisted projectiles, and is normally operated by a two-person team.

The CAF employs it primarily as an anti-armour weapon – mostly effective against light-armour platforms – though it can also be effectively used for other anti-material and anti-personnel purposes.

Given its relative light weight and portability, it is an exceptionally effective tool that continues to serve the CAF well.

**Q3: Are there CAF members who have taken leave to go to Ukraine? Do you have a number? And is it allowed?**

A3: The Government of Canada is advising Canadians to avoid all travel to Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. These travel advisories are applicable to members of the CAF. The Chief of the Defence Staff issued direction to CAF leadership on this question on March 24, 2022, restricting travel by all CAF members to Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia.

Members of the CAF are not authorized to travel to these countries unless they are part of a CDS-approved mission or duties. Personal travel to any of these countries is not authorized.

Members of the CAF are supporting our official efforts with regards to the situation in Ukraine, through contributions at home and abroad.

Members who want to contribute to our Armed Forces efforts in support of Operation REASSURANCE, should identify their willingness/availability to deploy to their chain of command so that we can look to activate them, should there be a requirement.

**Q4: What is Canada's commitment to the NATO Response Force (NRF)?**

A4: An additional 3,400 Canadian Armed Forces personnel across all branches of the service have already been placed at higher state of readiness to deploy should these forces be required by NATO. The CAF contributions to NRF are broken down into 4 tiers of readiness. There is a Very High Readiness Force that is already deployed under NATO control. Following on that formation, there are 3 additional force packages that are at various levels of readiness ranging from days to weeks. To summarize, CAF contributions to the NRF — a total 3400 members — are at varying levels of readiness.

CAF contributions to the NRF will be drawn from all branches, domains, and environments. Unfortunately, the exact number of capabilities and their readiness levels are classified, and not available for distribution at this time.

**Q4: Given Russia's global reach through all the domains of war, but specifically cyber, sea, air power projection, is Canada or are Canadians at risk here at home for helping to arm and train the Ukrainian forces?**

A4: We have no indications that Russia will direct kinetic military attacks against any NATO member, including Canada. With respect to cyber and other threats, the CAF is partnering on ongoing precautionary planning and efforts by federal agencies such as CSIS, CSE, RCMP, CAF and Public Safety, who hold overall responsibility for these issues.

**Q5: Have offensive operations by any component of the CAF's cyber force against aggressors or suspected hostile actors tied to Russia's invasion of Ukraine been authorized?**

A5: Canada's Defence Policy expanded our capacity to include active cyber operations authorized by the Government of Canada and more robust cyber defence through mission assurance. The policy states, "The employment of this capability will be approved by the Government on a mission-by-mission basis consistent with the employment of other military assets, and will be subject to the same rigour as other military uses of force. Cyber operations will be subject to all applicable domestic and international law."

Though we cannot release any further information about specific operations, we have been collaborating with the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) to enable the sharing of cyber threat intelligence with our partners in Ukraine.

Canada is committed to working with NATO to contribute to sovereign cyber effects, when appropriate, enhance NATO mission goals and objectives, and promote NATO resilience in the face of cyber threats from adversaries.

**Q6: Will NATO declare a no-fly zone over Ukraine?**

A6: Russia's invasion of Ukraine has caused widespread human suffering and destruction. In response, Canada has imposed severe sanctions and continues to provide humanitarian and financial support to Ukraine. We are committed to the transatlantic bond and will continue working with our allies and partners to respond to President Putin's aggression against Ukraine. Enforcing a no-fly zone requires military engagement using planes or anti-aircraft weaponry; responding to airspace violations would mean a direct military confrontation. If Russian or Allied planes were targeted or attacked, this could lead to a rapid escalation of hostilities, and even a full-fledged war. Canada calls on President Putin to cease all hostilities, remove all Russian forces from Ukrainian territory, and engage in dialogue and diplomacy in good faith.

**Operation REASSURANCE**

**Q7: What assets does the CAF currently have deployed in support of Op REASSURANCE?**

A7: Approximately 1,000 Canadian Armed Forces Members are deployed in support of Operation REASSURANCE, Canada's NATO assurance and deterrence measures in Central and Eastern Europe, making it Canada's largest current international military operation. Canada's contribution currently includes:

**eFP:**

- Canada, as the Framework Nation for eFP in Latvia, is responsible for leading a ten-nation multinational battle group, and for coordinating with Latvia and the contributing nations to help set the tone, pace and vision for the eFP.

- The enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) Battle Group, comprised of a mechanised infantry company, an artillery battery, a combat support company, and a combat service support company.
- The eFP Battle Group works within the Latvian Armed Forces infantry brigade, conducting joint training to be able to respond effectively to an attack and remains a tangible reminder that an attack against one member of the Alliance is an attack against all.

**Air:**

- Two C-130J tactical airlift aircraft, along with an air detachment of 40-50 CAF personnel, are contributing to allied and partner efforts in Europe and have transported over 3.5 million pounds of military donations since late February 2022.
- As part of Canada's support to NATO and European security, Canada has deployed a total of eight CF-18s to Romania. Air Task Force Romania (ATF-R), will conduct 24/7 Air Policing missions using a six aircraft rotation until December 2, 2022, and two additional aircraft have been temporarily deployed for concurrent NATO training activities.
- ATF-R activities include surveillance of Romanian and allied airspace, training with NATO counterparts and, if required, intercepting, identifying, and/or escorting aircraft that enter the Romanian Air Defence Identification Zone.

**MTF:**

- HMCS *Kingston* and HMCS *Summerside* are currently serving on a four month deployment in the Baltic Sea and North Atlantic region as part of Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group One until October 2022.
- HMCS *Summerside* deployed with an embarked Royal Canadian Navy clearance diving team, supported by mine countermeasure search capabilities using autonomous underwater vehicles aboard HMCS *Kingston*.

**MND-North:**

- On May 12 Prime Minister Trudeau announced Canada will deploy a Canadian Armed Forces general officer and six staff officers to Multinational Division North (MND N HQ), NATO's Divisional Headquarters supporting the enhanced Forward Presence – Latvia Battle Group.
- Brigadier-General Jean-Francois Cauden and the majority of CAF staff officers are in position at Multinational Division North (MND N HQ), NATO's Divisional Headquarters supporting the enhanced Forward Presence – Latvia Battle Group. The remaining staff are expected by the end of September 2022.

- Created in March 2019, NATO's Multinational Division North Headquarters performs several vital roles – including support for the defence planning of Baltic nations, and the coordination of regional military activities – such as the activities of enhanced Forward Presence forces.

**Q8: What are the responsibilities of a Framework Nation? How significant is this status for Canada?**

A8: Framework Nations are responsible for establishing and leading the multinational Battle Groups in Latvia, Poland, Estonia, and Lithuania. Canada, as the Framework Nation in Latvia, plays a leadership role among the Sending Nations by setting the tone, pace, and vision for eFP Latvia; coordinating with Latvia and other Sending Nations regarding the composition of NATO's eFP in Latvia; and providing support that better allows multinational eFP to come together and integrate as a single entity that can operate effectively with friendly forces in the region.

**Timeline**

- June 19, 2017 – Canadian-led NATO enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group Latvia was stood up during a ceremony at Camp Adazi, Latvia.
- July 10, 2018 – The Prime Minister of Canada announced the renewal of Canada's contribution to NATO's enhanced Forward Presence until March 2023.
- June 2021 – Inauguration of the Multinational Headquarters (MNHQ) building.
- February 2022 – Defence Minister Anita Anand announced on February 22, 2022, that Canada will be sending additional military contributions to support NATO operations in Europe in the face of rising tensions in the region.
- On February 24, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a “special military operation” and Russian troops launched their anticipated invasion of Ukraine.
- On March 8, 2022, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced that Canada will renew its multi-year commitment to Operation REASSURANCE, the CAF support to NATO's assurance and deterrence measures in Central and Eastern Europe. This announcement is a year ahead of schedule and responds to the changing security situation in Eastern Europe.
- On June 29, 2022, the Minister of National Defence signed a joint declaration with the Latvian Prime Minister and the Minister for Defence, to augment NATO's enhanced Forward Presence Latvia. Going forward, Canada will:
  - Continue to lead NATO forces as the Framework Nation of Latvia
  - Work with Latvia and NATO Allies to generate and stage forces in order to surge to a combat capable brigade;
  - Establish and lead elements of a forward brigade command and control, and;
  - Be prepared to provide critical capabilities to operations, such as ammunition and explosives, air defence systems, and anti-tank weapons systems.
- August 4, 2022 – Minister of National Defence announces the deployment of Canadian Armed Forces to train Ukrainian soldiers in the United Kingdom under Op UNIFIER

**Q9: Is the Battle Group conducting information operations in Latvia?**

A9: We are supported by personnel who are trained in Information Operations, but they are focused on monitoring activities, such as studying media reports for fabricated and exaggerated reports designed to discredit us and our partners. We work in close collaboration with our Latvian hosts and NATO Allies to understand the information environment in Latvia, and communicate transparently what we do and why we do it.

**Q10: The Kremlin claims that your presence in the Baltics is a hostile act that could lead to war: Do you think your presence here is aggressive?**

A10: Our presence in Latvia is defensive in nature and we are committed to preserving peace and, if required, protecting the people of Latvia, our allies, and ourselves.

Our presence is also proportionate to the current security environment and tailored to avoid an increase in tensions. We are committed to avoiding conflict.

Our deployment to Latvia is part of overarching NATO and Government of Canada policies regarding Russia. These policies include both deterrence and dialogue.

### ***Task Force Poland***

**Q11: What types of tasks did CAF personnel undertake on this mission?**

A11: From April to the end of July, 2022, CAF provided assistance to Ukrainian refugees in reception centres located in Warsaw. These centres, operated by the Polish Territorial Defence Force, are continuing to coordinate the onward movement of Ukrainian refugees in Poland and across Europe. While deployed, the CAF members helped thousands of refugees with administrative support, limited medical care, mental health supports and spiritual services, enabled by Ukrainian-speaking CAF personnel. The CAF is proud to have been on the ground in Poland contributing to the care of those forced from their homes by this tragic conflict. We thank our Polish hosts and our thoughts remain with those we helped and those who remain affected by the war in Ukraine.

- By the numbers:
  - Health Services provided primary care to more than 2700 patients
  - Chaplains provided spiritual support to more than 5800 refugees
  - CAF translators gave linguistic support to over 30000 Ukrainians

**Q12: What are the details of the CAF deployment of trainers to the training of Ukraine Security Forces in the UK?**

A12: Initially, two cohorts of trainers will be deployed, with a command and control element, and the potential for a third training team to deploy at a later date, for a potential total of 225 CAF personnel for this mission.



The members are mostly drawn from 3rd Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (3 PPCLI) based out of Edmonton, Alberta.

This rotation will last for approximately four months, with a potential to continue should conditions permit.

Each serial is designed to be delivered in 21 days and will focus on soldier skills required for frontline combat. Lessons will cover such topics as weapons handling, battlefield first aid, fieldcraft, patrol tactics, and the Law of Armed Conflict.

From 2015 to 2022, Op UNIFIER, Canada's military training and capacity building mission in Ukraine, had evolved from a training mission, to one where the majority of the training was conducted by Ukrainians, with Canadians acting as advisors and mentors. This training in the UK, however, is focused on those who have little military experience, but who now feel the need to take up arms to defend their country.

CAF trainers will initially be operating from a British military base in the Southeast of the country, with the potential to move to other locations.

The United Kingdom is providing the necessary support for this training, such as equipment and linguists, but request allied support in the provision of trainers. We thank the United Kingdom for leading this initiative and are proud to once again work alongside one of our longest standing allies.

On August 25, the deployed CAF members began their first training serial of Ukrainian recruits in the United Kingdom as Operation UNIFIER resumes.

## **Cyr Maj SA@ADM(PA) DGPA@Ottawa-Hull**

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**From:** Perreault BGen R@ADM(PA) DGPA@Ottawa-Hull  
**Sent:** March 11, 2022 3:37 PM  
**To:** Aptowitz E@ADM(PA) DOAS@Ottawa-Hull  
**Subject:** RE: More nuance/advice to share through PA

Thanks for sharing w wider audience.  
Rick

BGen/Bgén Richard Perreault  
(He/il)

Director General Public Affairs, ADM(PA)  
Canadian Armed Forces  
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**From:** Aptowitz E@ADM(PA) DOAS@Ottawa-Hull  
**Sent:** March 11, 2022 3:35 PM  
**To:** Salloum Col AE@ADM(PA) DPAPO@Ottawa-Hull <ANDRE.SALLOUM@forces.gc.ca>  
**Cc:** White VC@ADM(PA) DGPA@Ottawa-Hull <VANCE.WHITE@forces.gc.ca>; Perreault BGen R@ADM(PA) DGPA@Ottawa-Hull <RICHARD.PERREault@forces.gc.ca>  
**Subject:** More nuance/advice to share through PA

Hi Andre,

I just got this information from the Directorate of NATO Policy, in response to a question that came for COS CDSO regarding Azov:

SFU (*Security Forces of Ukraine*) is not actually an official acronym, so we shouldn't use it in public-facing documents. It's fine to use for our internal documents, but it's not an organization like Armed Force of Ukraine (AFU) or the National Guard of Ukraine (NGU – which is under the Ministry of the Interior).

We (Canada) train both the AFU and NGU under UNIFIER, so loosely use the term “security forces of Ukraine”, or “Ukraine’s security forces”, because it’s not just the armed forces we are training. It’s true that Azov was brought into the NGU, but we don’t train them because they are fanatics, and we don’t share their values. It’s true that the Azov has dogged us as an issue for years, but we should definitely not hide from the fact that we train the NGU because of a small minority in their ranks.

I thought this was something that should also be reflected in our PA products, so that we are all aligned in the consistent and proper use of acronyms and names when referring to Ukraine’s security forces.

For consideration as to whether/how to disseminate.

Cheers  
Elana

**Cyr Maj SA@ADM(PA) DGPA@Ottawa-Hull**

---

**From:** Hennessy LCol AD@ADM(PA) DPAPO@Ottawa-Hull  
**Sent:** May 5, 2022 10:57 AM  
**To:** Perreault BGen R@ADM(PA) DGPA@Ottawa-Hull  
**Subject:** Fwd: Language AB

Begin forwarded message:

**From:** "Williamson Cdr KL@CDS@Ottawa-Hull" <Kelly.Williamson@forces.gc.ca>  
**Date:** May 5, 2022 at 10:49:05 AM EDT  
**To:** "Hennessy LCol AD@ADM(PA) DPAPO@Ottawa-Hull" <ANDREW.HENNESSY@forces.gc.ca>  
**Subject:** FW: Language AB

Hi Andrew, As a follow up to yesterday, moving forward:

- a) Can you advise on which parts of the SJS Report DGP has agreed to declassify.
- b) Can you advise if any of the CJOC report can or will be declassified.

Just trying to determine how we make the information available moving forward if required.

Thanks,  
Kelly

**From:** Bonnardot LCdr DBA@ADM(PA) DPAPO@Ottawa-Hull  
**Sent:** May 4, 2022 1:31 PM  
**To:** Williamson Cdr KL@CDS@Ottawa-Hull <Kelly.Williamson@forces.gc.ca>  
**Cc:** +ADM(PA) SJSCLPA - SMA(AP)EMISLCAP@ADM(PA)@Ottawa-Hull <ADMMPA\_SJSCLPA-SMAAP\_EMISLCAP@forces.gc.ca>; +ADM(PA) Pol PA - Pol AP@ADM(PA)DPAPI@Ottawa-Hull <ADMPAPoIPA-PoIAP@forces.gc.ca>  
**Subject:** Language AB

Ma'am,

My apologies for this long email.

**Context**

Please note that the following language on the AB has been vetted by DGP, Pol PA and CJOC.

- This was used to answer to the request yesterday (full answer below from MLO), providing to you for consistency.
- For info, DGP agreed to declassify part of SJS report but is against declassifying CJOC report.

**Language**

- Canada does not train members of Azov Battalion – this has never been a part of our mandate. The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces are strongly opposed to the glorification of Nazism and all forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, intolerance and extremism. In all of our international relationships, we seek to promote tolerance, inclusiveness and respect for human rights, diversity and the rule of law.
- Our close bilateral relationship with Ukraine includes ongoing dialogue on the development of a diverse and inclusive Ukraine. What has always been clear is that we have not - nor will we - be providing training support to Azov and affiliated entities. We continue to vehemently oppose any and all racist, discriminatory and hateful views and the groups that promote them.
- Senior Leaders have had an opportunity to review the CAF report, and, of the nearly 700 courses delivered to more than 33,000 members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces by the Canadian Armed Forces, we've identified a few of unintentional interactions in which a very limited number of our members deployed on Operation UNIFIER were inadvertently in the presence of, or had inadvertently engaged with, a very limited number of individuals associated with the Azov Battalion.
- Members of the CAF have not knowingly ever provided training or support to extremists elements and the CAF takes several steps to ensure training is not provided to extremists elements.
- We have taken each of these cases very seriously and drawn important lessons from them which has helped us improve our vetting as well as the training we provide to our own members to enhance their ability to quickly identify, address and report any future cases of inadvertent contact. CAF members are authorized and empowered to take action, investigate and cease training as necessary, if questions over conduct or association arise.
- We are of course concerned and deeply regret that a handful of individuals slipped through some of our screening measures – fortunately– in each case, once individuals were identified, the issue was immediately addressed – and the very limited engagement was immediately ceased.
- There have been instances where CAF individuals based in Ukraine have attended meetings or ceremonies during which Azov affiliated entities may have been present. In all cases, members of the CAF have always been directed to not train and to limit and avoid contact with these individuals.

-----  
**Response to**

Canada does not train members of Azov Battalion – this has never been a part of our mandate. The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces are strongly opposed to the glorification of Nazism and all forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, intolerance and extremism. In all of our international relationships, we seek to promote tolerance, inclusiveness and respect for human rights, diversity and the rule of law.

Our close bilateral relationship with Ukraine includes ongoing dialogue on the development of a diverse and inclusive Ukraine. What has always been clear is that we have not - nor will we - be providing training support to Azov and affiliated entities. All Task-Force Ukraine personnel receive pre-deployment training on Right Wing Extremism that includes soldier cards on RWE symbols and means for visual recognition. This training is repeated during in-theatre hand-over.

Regarding your questions about our review of the George Washington University report findings, the review was started in the Fall of 2021 and is now complete. The review examined whether the Canadian Armed Forces had exercised their due diligence in preventing members of right-wing extremist organizations from receiving training as part of Operation UNIFIER.

The report is still under review by the CAF chain of command, but it concludes that there was no factual basis found of neo-Nazi links for the group trained by Task-Force Ukraine (line added as requested by MNDO). The CAF takes every reasonable measure to ensure no training is provided to members of extremist elements.

The report did find that, of the nearly 700 courses delivered to more than 33,000 members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces by the Canadian Armed Forces, there were a few unintentional interactions in which a very limited number of our members deployed on Operation UNIFIER were inadvertently in the presence of, or had inadvertently engaged with, a very limited number of individuals associated with the Azov Battalion. For example, there have been instances where CAF individuals based in Ukraine have attended meetings or ceremonies during which Azov affiliated entities may have been present.

To be clear, these were passing interactions and not training related. In each case, once individuals were identified, the issue was immediately addressed and the very limited engagement was ceased. In all cases, members of the CAF have always been directed to not train and to limit and avoid contact with these individuals.

We have taken each of these cases very seriously and drawn important lessons from them which has helped us improve our vetting as well as the training we provide to our own members to enhance their ability to quickly identify, address and report any future cases of inadvertent contact.

Given that the report contains sensitive/classified information, analysis is currently underway to determine what may be shared publicly in the near future.

-----  
Happy to answer any question you might have at this point.

Respectfully,

**Delphine Bonnardot, Ph. D**  
**Lieutenant-Commander/Capitaine de corvette**

A/Head -Public Affairs Plans – Strategic Joint Staff  
Assistant Deputy Minister (Public Affairs)  
Canadian Armed Forces  
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Chef(I) – Affaires publiques – Plans - État-major interarmées stratégique  
Sous-ministre Adjoint (Affaires publiques)  
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DWAN :[Delphine.Bonnardot@forces.gc.ca](mailto:Delphine.Bonnardot@forces.gc.ca)

## CORRESPONDENCE

**From:**  
**Sent:** April 30, 2022 8:15 AM  
**To:** [+MCU@Corp\\_Sec\\_DSCS@Ottawa-Hull](mailto:+MCU@Corp_Sec_DSCS@Ottawa-Hull)  
**Cc:** [Lalonde Marie-France - Députée](#); [Candice - M.P. Bergen](#)  
**Subject:** CAF TRAINING AZOV BATTALION

---

Dear Minister, in light of the recent evidence that Canada has trained AZOV extremists in the Ukraine, what is being done to ensure:

- a. better methods be developed of scrutinizing those trained by the CAF;
- b. those who knowingly trained or associated with these neo-Nazis be disciplined; and
- c. Canada stops sending military arms to Ukraine if there is evidence that some of these weapons are being used by the AZOV Movement.

As a veteran of the CAF, I am proud of Canada's accomplishments at home and abroad. I know that it is difficult to sift through world politics and rhetoric when deciding who to support, but more effort is required to ensure that Canada does not inadvertently do 'more harm than good'.

Respectfully yours,

**From:** [McCambridge\\_M@Corp\\_Sec\\_DSCS@Ottawa-Hull](mailto:McCambridge_M@Corp_Sec_DSCS@Ottawa-Hull)  
**Sent:** April 13, 2022 4:59 PM  
**To:** [+ADM\(PA\)\\_MLO@ADM\(PA\)\\_DGPA@Ottawa-Hull](mailto:+ADM(PA)_MLO@ADM(PA)_DGPA@Ottawa-Hull); [Minden\\_DM@MND@Ottawa-Hull](mailto:Minden_DM@MND@Ottawa-Hull)  
**Subject:** FW: media request re: extremists in Ukrainian military

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**Importance:** High

Hello

Please see follow up from below.

Mark McCambridge  
Acting Chief of Operations | Chef des Opérations, par interim  
Minister's Correspondence Unit (MCU) | Unité de la correspondance du ministre (UCM)  
Department of National Defence - Government of Canada | Ministère de la Défense nationale -  
Gouvernement du Canada  
[mark.mccambridge@forces.gc.ca](mailto:mark.mccambridge@forces.gc.ca) | Tel: 613-904-5186

---

**From:**  
**Sent:** April 13, 2022 4:56 PM  
**To:** [+MCU@Corp\\_Sec\\_DSCS@Ottawa-Hull](mailto:+MCU@Corp_Sec_DSCS@Ottawa-Hull) <[DND\\_MND@forces.gc.ca](mailto:DND_MND@forces.gc.ca)>  
**Subject:** RE: media request re: extremists in Ukrainian military  
**Importance:** High

Afternoon,

Following up on this as every agency I have spoken to has stated you will be providing a response – when can I expect your statement?

---

**From:**  
**Sent:** April-13-22 12:49 PM  
**To:** '[mlo-blm@forces.gc.ca](mailto:mlo-blm@forces.gc.ca)' <[mlo-blm@forces.gc.ca](mailto:mlo-blm@forces.gc.ca)>; '[DND\\_MND@forces.gc.ca](mailto:DND_MND@forces.gc.ca)' <[DND\\_MND@forces.gc.ca](mailto:DND_MND@forces.gc.ca)>  
**Subject:** RE: media request re: extremists in Ukrainian military  
**Importance:** High

Good afternoon,

I am following up on our discussions last year. More developments have come to light and it is really an urgent and pressing matter that this “review” promised is published or widened.

I wrote a thread about it here:  
extremists in the Ukrainian military bragging about being trained by Canadians. The DND promised a review.

Further to my initial reporting, David Pugliese of the Ottawa Citizen uncovered that not only did CAF leaders meet with known extremists from the Azov Battalion in Ukraine, their concern was that the media would find out. <https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/canadian-officials-who-met-with-ukrainian-unit-linked-to-neo-nazis-feared-exposure-by-news-media-documents>

Now, Simon Coutou of Radio Canada has proven that despite CAF promises to never train Azov, we did. He explains in his piece – there are denials all around. <https://ici.radio-canada.ca/nouvelle/1873461/canada-regiment-ukrainien-lie-extreme-droite-azov?fromApp=appInfofos&partageApp=appInfoOS&accesVia=partage>

I asked in my initial piece about the concept of liability – if a Ukrainian extremist commits a crime with Canadian tech and Canadian training – how is Canada not in some way liable, especially when its clear we KNEW they were extremists?

I want to know – what is the DND response to these further developments?  
When will your initial review on the study from last year be published? And will it be widened after these revelations?  
While fully recognizing that the CAF does not have the mandate to screen candidates for Op. UNIFIER – how can we reliably claim that our tech and our training has not and will not contribute to known extremist networks in Ukraine that are now better armed thanks to us, and other NATO allies.

Thanks,

---

**From:** [mlo-blm@forces.gc.ca](mailto:mlo-blm@forces.gc.ca) <[mlo-blm@forces.gc.ca](mailto:mlo-blm@forces.gc.ca)>

**Sent:** October-18-21 4:59 PM

**To:** >; [mlo-blm@forces.gc.ca](mailto:mlo-blm@forces.gc.ca)

**Subject:** [EXT]RE: media request re: extremists in Ukrainian military

The Department of National Defence is very concerned by the findings of the George Washington University study, which identified some cadets at Ukraine’s National Army Academy who held and propagated extremist views and may have received training from the CAF.

In light of these findings, DND will be conducting a thorough review of this report, including whether current policies and procedures in place are sufficiently stringent to flag and prevent the CAF from



unwittingly aiding those whose views it fundamentally opposes.

Canada has a long history of combatting the views allegedly expressed by these select few. The Canadian military seeks to continue its tradition of uplifting human rights through its engagements around the world, especially in countries for whom the fight is a constant struggle.

At this time, Canada relies on the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence to vet its members, while remaining vigilant to how these views are not always picked up by such procedures. If Canadian soldiers suspect that their Ukrainian counterparts or trainees hold racist views, they are removed immediately. There is no burden of proof on the CAF to demonstrate this beyond a reasonable doubt.

When Ukrainian military officers are selected to pursue opportunities in Canada, it is a firm prerequisite that the members not hold values contrary to those held by their Canadian hosts or the Ukrainian government.

We thank the Friends of the Simon Wiesenthal Centre for bringing attention to this subject in particular, and for the work they do each and every day in combating anti-Semitism and racism in all forms.

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**From:****Sent:** October 16, 2021 2:45 PM**To:** +ADM(PA) MLO@ADM(PA) DGPA@Ottawa-Hull <[mlo-blm@forces.gc.ca](mailto:mlo-blm@forces.gc.ca)>**Subject:** RE: media request re: extremists in Ukrainian military

Thank you I appreciate the timely response – I will be working on this for the next few days, so if possible a fuller statement by Monday by 3pm EST would be excellent.

---

**From:** [mlo-blm@forces.gc.ca](mailto:mlo-blm@forces.gc.ca) <[mlo-blm@forces.gc.ca](mailto:mlo-blm@forces.gc.ca)>**Sent:** October-16-21 2:44 PM**To:** >; [mlo-blm@forces.gc.ca](mailto:mlo-blm@forces.gc.ca)**Subject:** [EXT]RE: media request re: extremists in Ukrainian military

Hi

Unfortunately, we won't be able to address all of your questions today – more likely next week.

If you need something now, though, we can tell you that, when it comes to the screening of Security Forces of Ukraine (SFU) members for far right views and ties, it is the responsibility of each nation to screen and vet the members of their armed forces.

The CAF does not have the authority to screen and vet any nation's Armed Forces members they train, however, should they find any nation's Security Forces member expressing or showing signs of that type of attitude, they would be ejected from any training that the CAF would provide.

The CAF does not tolerate extremist views or conduct within its own ranks, therefore it will not tolerate it from any other nation's Armed Forces members it trains.

Hope this helps a bit.

---

**From:**  
**Sent:** October 16, 2021 2:12 PM  
**To:** +ADM(PA) MLO@ADM(PA) DGPA@Ottawa-Hull <[mlo-blm@forces.gc.ca](mailto:mlo-blm@forces.gc.ca)>  
**Subject:** media request re: extremists in Ukrainian military  
**Importance:** High

Good Afternoon,

I am writing an article on a study done by George Washington University that states there are overt far-right extremists in the Ukrainian military who boast of being trained by Canada and her allies.

I am reaching out for a statement and would appreciate the answers to the following:

- Were the Canadian Armed Forces aware of the allegations of far-right extremism in the Ukrainian military? Including in forces it has trained?
- What responsibility, if any, does the CAF have to vet the people they are training in other countries?
- What is the liability or responsibility Canada could hold if those extremists commit violent acts with the training and tech provided by the CAF?
- Will the CAF be re-evaluating Op. UNIFIER in light of this information?
- Do you think renewal beyond the current 2022 benchmark is likely?

Thank you

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**External Email:** Please use caution when opening links and attachments / **Courriel externe:** Soyez prudent avec les liens et documents joints

**From:** [Anand, Anita - M.P.](#)  
**Sent:** May 5, 2022 8:50 AM  
**To:** [+MCU@Corp Sec DSCS@Ottawa-Hull](#)  
**Subject:** FW: "We don't want them to die. They won't surrender. They are waiting for the bravest countries to evacuate them."

---

**From:**  
**Sent:** May 4, 2022 8:51 PM  
**To:** Anand, Anita - M.P. <[Anita.Anand@parl.gc.ca](mailto:Anita.Anand@parl.gc.ca)>; Trudeau, Justin - Député <[justin.trudeau@parl.gc.ca](mailto:justin.trudeau@parl.gc.ca)>; Jagmeet Singh <[canadasndp@ndp.ca](mailto:canadasndp@ndp.ca)>; Bergen, Candice - M.P. <[candice.bergen@parl.gc.ca](mailto:candice.bergen@parl.gc.ca)>  
**Subject:** "We don't want them to die. They won't surrender. They are waiting for the bravest countries to evacuate them."

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/russia-ukraine-war-1.6440695>

Dear Prime Minister Trudeau, Minister of Defence Anita Anand, and members of Parliament Jagmeet Singh and Candice Bergen,

I wish to express that the West cannot continue to allow the Russians to further destroy the Ukraine, killing thousands of innocent people and defenders of Ukraine. It seems ridiculous that Belarus is going to conduct military exercises at a time of war. It seems more likely that Belarus will engage in this war and expand it further. When will other ex-soviet states join in the Russian effort to destroy Ukraine?

It's time for NATO to draw the line even further. Russia has to be put on notice that if other nations join Russia's unprovoked and brutal war on Ukraine, then NATO will respond with force.

I will support Canada sending our military into the conflict and coming to the defense of the Ukrainian people. With or without NATO.

Regards

PS - seeing infants coming out of the destroyed Azovstal this week during the Red Crosses evacuation of some civilians was very upsetting. The Russians have been using bunker Buster bombs on this plant which are the most powerful non nuclear bombs. No children or civilians should be subject to such a devastating weapon.